ot: so how do a merchant ship and destroyer have a collision?

[bigbill]

Originally Posted by AngryScientist

bill,

i've followed your posts here and across the hall about your son. congratulations to both of you for all he's accomplished up to this point.

i know you know this, but try not to steer him too hard, especially when it comes to submarine service - that's not a career you want to be "talked into".

some decisions a man needs to make for himself.

He's wanted the Naval Academy for a few years. I'm helping to open some doors and then it's all on him. He thinks he knows what he wants, but he'll need to get some experience to make his decision. All I know is submarines, carriers, nuclear power, and some of shipyard engineering world (EDO), he'll have people all around him for influence, he'll find his way.

[Fuzzy2964]

Good luck to your son on securing an appointment. I’m a USNA grad, retired with 21 years of service as a Naval Aviator. I have a very Navy family ... 2 of my brothers and a sister are USNA grads also. Sounds like you have things well in hand, but if I can be of any help please contact me.

[54ny77]

Good luck to your son!

Buddy of mine was SSN-653. Twenty knots!

Originally Posted by bigbill

He's wanted the Naval Academy for a few years. I'm helping to open some doors and then it's all on him. He thinks he knows what he wants, but he'll need to get some experience to make his decision. All I know is submarines, carriers, nuclear power, and some of shipyard engineering world (EDO), he'll have people all around him for influence, he'll find his way.

[bigbill]

Originally Posted by Fuzzy2964

Good luck to your son on securing an appointment. I’m a USNA grad, retired with 21 years of service as a Naval Aviator. I have a very Navy family ... 2 of my brothers and a sister are USNA grads also. Sounds like you have things well in hand, but if I can be of any help please contact me.

I think it's just a matter of USNA getting everything he's recently accomplished. Prior to December, he had a Presidential Nom, a 30 ACT, was medically qualified, and had done well on the fitness test during Summer Seminar. In mid December, he scored a 34 ACT and got a Congressional Nom. I think it's just a matter of time.

I was a Mustang, E-1 to E-8 as a nuke submarine electrician and then O-1E to O-4 as a nuke LDO. SSBN728, SSN671, SSBN626, SSN683, CVN69, CVN71, CVN68, and AS39. I visited the Academy once. Little did I know the first ship of my 27 year career would be the newest.

[oldpotatoe]

Originally Posted by bigbill

I told him he needs to get an engineering degree of some kind. I have a hard time picturing him doing BUDS. I think he ought to do submarines like I did during the first 15 years of my career.

BTW, nice article about your MX Leader. I still have mine that I bought in 1998. Built up with a mix of Record 10 with alloy Centaur shifters (the good ones).

I agree on the engineering degree..USNA one of the best. In any field he goes for in the USN, a technical degree will help(and may be required). Even when just developing 'monkey skills' flying a jet.

Since you were a 'Nuke', did you get to have the 'Rickover' experience?

Good luck to him, with 2 nominations, I think he has a very good chance.

Ahh, the MXL...4 inches of snow on the ground and about 10 degrees right now..dark, cold..don't like this time of year..I call Nov-Feb the 'black months'...

[bigbill]

Originally Posted by oldpotatoe

I agree on the engineering degree..USNA one of the best. In any field he goes for in the USN, a technical degree will help(and may be required). Even when just developing 'monkey skills' flying a jet.

Since you were a 'Nuke', did you get to have the 'Rickover' experience?

Good luck to him, with 2 nominations, I think he has a very good chance.

Ahh, the MXL...4 inches of snow on the ground and about 10 degrees right now..dark, cold..don't like this time of year..I call Nov-Feb the 'black months'...

Rickover died while I was in Nuclear Power School in 1986. I didn't have to see the director (4 Star) until 1999 when I was selected for LDO. I got to see Admiral Skip Bowman, the tannest man alive. He stayed beyond the standard 6 year tour and later on, I worked for his successor Adm Donald when I managed the closure of the NATO base on the island of Santo Stefano, Sardinia. His successor was tapped to be the CNO after a few years.

I think my son has a good chance, the Congressional nomination kind of took some pressure off him. The Presidential nomination was just because I was retired, the Congressional was earned by him and he did it by doing leadership programs, writing essays, and giving speeches to VFW and American Legion. He also got support from a retired USMC General, Paul Van Riper who achieved fame in 2002 by sinking the US Fleet in an exercise where he was the leader of country Orange (Iran).

[CaptStash]

Originally Posted by bigbill

I'm a retired shipdriver. I was an Officer of the Deck on carriers (1100' and 100K tons) and in my duties, I was in charge of a bridge team that included two junior officers, and five enlisted watchstanders. My job was the safe operation of the ship and to train the junior officers to have my job. Sleep deprivation can be a factor, but command environment where watchstanders feel free to speak up (questioning attitude) are vital.

Congrats to your son BigBill, and forgive me, but I'd like to steer this conversation back to the original subject.

Bill makes an important point above when he mentions the importance of watchstanders being in an environment and trained to speak up if something doesn't seem right. This is called situational awareness. The maritime industry long ago adopted Bridge Resource Management concepts from the aviation industry, who called it Cockpit Resource Management. All merchant officers (worldwide) are required to complete a a BRM course every five years.

While the two major incidents involving collisions between Naval ships and merchant vessels were quite different, they appear to share a common thread of lack of situational awareness. We really don't know a lot about what happened with the Fitzgerald yet,a s the actions of the merhcant vessel have not yet been released (they'll be covered in the report being prepared by the USCG for the NAVY), but we know for sure what happened ont he McCain, and it isn't pretty.

The McCain slowed down and turned in front of a merchant ship (a relatively small tanker named the Alnic MC). The series of events leading up to the collision would be funny if not for the loss of life. In a nut shell, the bridge crew tried to shift the steering from one location to another, didn't know what they were doing, and then tried to slow down, but only slowed one engine, thus turning the vessel into the path of the tanker. What boggles the mind, is that nobody bothered to actually look at the shaft tachometers, and nobody seemed to have a good handle on what should be pretty simple mechanics of shifting helm positions. The entrance to the Straits of Singapore is busy, but it is not a particularly challenging situation, as you aren't encountering significant crossing traffic.

What the NAVY has not addressed, and what I feel is most important, is that they have no "ship driver" track. Somehow, amongst all their other duties, and relatively few months at sea under way, naval officers are supposed to magically gain the same competence that it takes years at sea, standing two watches every day, that merchant officers get. The British Navy requires all of their officers to become fully STCW certified. STCW refers to the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers. In the USN, there is little int he way of actual watchkeeping training, and amazing number of people on the bridge that apparently (at least anecdotally) cause more confusion than help. Additionally, they rely on info. from the CIC, whose personnel don't have the same situational awareness since they can't look out the window. Contrary to popular belief, you can't really tell a mega container ship from a bunker barge with a radar.

The shear number of merchant ships in the world fleet has continued to grow, making our oceans ever more crowded. This has put pressure on the supply of qualified merchant officers, resulting in a lack of uniform quality. In my work, I see mostly tank ships, who, along with passenger ship officers, are generally the best paid, best trained and most professional. At the opposite end of the spectrum are the officers on dry bulk carriers, and (international) container ships (not true with American flag vessels, which are very well operated and have high pay due to the Jones Act), both of which tend to have slim profit margins. Judging by what we know of the Fitzgerald's collision, there can be no doubt that the container vessel shares some of the blame for the collision.

The bottom line is that until the USN addresses the training gap, they will continue to have avoidable incidents like the ones we had in 2017.

CaptStash....

[bigbill]

Originally Posted by CaptStash

Congrats to your son BigBill, and forgive me, but I'd like to steer this conversation back to the original subject.

Bill makes an important point above when he mentions the importance of watchstanders being in an environment and trained to speak up if something doesn't seem right. This is called situational awareness. The maritime industry long ago adopted Bridge Resource Management concepts from the aviation industry, who called it Cockpit Resource Management. All merchant officers (worldwide) are required to complete a a BRM course every five years.

While the two major incidents involving collisions between Naval ships and merchant vessels were quite different, they appear to share a common thread of lack of situational awareness. We really don't know a lot about what happened with the Fitzgerald yet,a s the actions of the merhcant vessel have not yet been released (they'll be covered in the report being prepared by the USCG for the NAVY), but we know for sure what happened ont he McCain, and it isn't pretty.

The McCain slowed down and turned in front of a merchant ship (a relatively small tanker named the Alnic MC). The series of events leading up to the collision would be funny if not for the loss of life. In a nut shell, the bridge crew tried to shift the steering from one location to another, didn't know what they were doing, and then tried to slow down, but only slowed one engine, thus turning the vessel into the path of the tanker. What boggles the mind, is that nobody bothered to actually look at the shaft tachometers, and nobody seemed to have a good handle on what should be pretty simple mechanics of shifting helm positions. The entrance to the Straits of Singapore is busy, but it is not a particularly challenging situation, as you aren't encountering significant crossing traffic.

What the NAVY has not addressed, and what I feel is most important, is that they have no "ship driver" track. Somehow, amongst all their other duties, and relatively few months at sea under way, naval officers are supposed to magically gain the same competence that it takes years at sea, standing two watches every day, that merchant officers get. The British Navy requires all of their officers to become fully STCW certified. STCW refers to the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers. In the USN, there is little int he way of actual watchkeeping training, and amazing number of people on the bridge that apparently (at least anecdotally) cause more confusion than help. Additionally, they rely on info. from the CIC, whose personnel don't have the same situational awareness since they can't look out the window. Contrary to popular belief, you can't really tell a mega container ship from a bunker barge with a radar.

The shear number of merchant ships in the world fleet has continued to grow, making our oceans ever more crowded. This has put pressure on the supply of qualified merchant officers, resulting in a lack of uniform quality. In my work, I see mostly tank ships, who, along with passenger ship officers, are generally the best paid, best trained and most professional. At the opposite end of the spectrum are the officers on dry bulk carriers, and (international) container ships (not true with American flag vessels, which are very well operated and have high pay due to the Jones Act), both of which tend to have slim profit margins. Judging by what we know of the Fitzgerald's collision, there can be no doubt that the container vessel shares some of the blame for the collision.

The bottom line is that until the USN addresses the training gap, they will continue to have avoidable incidents like the ones we had in 2017.

CaptStash....

This is what I discussed on the previous page, the lack of training and proficiency that goes all the way to the top. We've shifted our focus to the Pacific to counter the Chinese and to some extent, the Indians. The Russians like to rattle sabers with their navy but it's really a collection of Cold War relics that can't deploy more than a few weeks at time. We asked too much of our destroyer and cruiser force but meanwhile continue to invest in the Littoral Combat Ship which is an answer to a question not asked. We overtasked our existing ships and cut back on maintenance, training, and professional development. All because unit and squadron commanders didn't have the situation awareness or guts to say no to a task.

I've done two watches a day for six months at a time in the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean. I was one of the core Officer of the Decks responsible for training new officers. I was 4 hours on, 8 hours off, 08-12 and 20-24. I also had a department head job in the engineering plant. I had no formal training or classroom time, I was paired up with a career Surface Warfare Officer who spent 3 months training me about 10 hours a day on the bridge. We had a tactical operations plot that kept track of other ships using radar, but they didn't have windows unless they walked out to the bridge. When I was on watch, they knew to grab binoculars and look to avoid getting embarrassed by me. One watch I asked about a contact on the horizon and was told it was a thunderstorm. The thunderstorm said "COSCO" on the side and wasn't responding to radio coms.

[CaptStash]

Originally Posted by bigbill

This is what I discussed on the previous page, the lack of training and proficiency that goes all the way to the top. We've shifted our focus to the Pacific to counter the Chinese and to some extent, the Indians. The Russians like to rattle sabers with their navy but it's really a collection of Cold War relics that can't deploy more than a few weeks at time. We asked too much of our destroyer and cruiser force but meanwhile continue to invest in the Littoral Combat Ship which is an answer to a question not asked. We overtasked our existing ships and cut back on maintenance, training, and professional development. All because unit and squadron commanders didn't have the situation awareness or guts to say no to a task.

I've done two watches a day for six months at a time in the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean. I was one of the core Officer of the Decks responsible for training new officers. I was 4 hours on, 8 hours off, 08-12 and 20-24. I also had a department head job in the engineering plant. I had no formal training or classroom time, I was paired up with a career Surface Warfare Officer who spent 3 months training me about 10 hours a day on the bridge. We had a tactical operations plot that kept track of other ships using radar, but they didn't have windows unless they walked out to the bridge. When I was on watch, they knew to grab binoculars and look to avoid getting embarrassed by me. One watch I asked about a contact on the horizon and was told it was a thunderstorm. The thunderstorm said "COSCO" on the side and wasn't responding to radio coms.

And I hate to say it Bill, but you just made my point. You have described the experience that a young Third Mate (entry level deck officer) has. And that doesn't even account for the years of classroom training a Third Mate has as well. The good news is that part of the fallout from this year of disaster is that the USN intends to phase in proper commercial type navigation radars with full ARPA (Automatic Radar Plotting Aids) as well as ECDIS (Electronic Chart Display Systems) and have now authorized their vessels to activate their AIS (Automatic Identification Systems) when operating in heavily trafficked areas. All three will help, there's no doubt. But the first two of three take a fair amount of training to use appropriately. How well they are utilized is still very much an open question.

I still feel that the best answer to the problem is the simplest. Make deck officer (and engineering officer for that matter) an actual career track. Set it up so that you can continue to be promoted by gaining experience in the wheelhouse, and specializing in, as you called it, "ship driving."

CaptStash....

[bigbill]

Originally Posted by CaptStash

And I hate to say it Bill, but you just made my point. You have described the experience that a young Third Mate (entry level deck officer) has. And that doesn't even account for the years of classroom training a Third Mate has as well. The good news is that part of the fallout from this year of disaster is that the USN intends to phase in proper commercial type navigation radars with full ARPA (Automatic Radar Plotting Aids) as well as ECDIS (Electronic Chart Display Systems) and have now authorized their vessels to activate their AIS (Automatic Identification Systems) when operating in heavily trafficked areas. All three will help, there's no doubt. But the first two of three take a fair amount of training to use appropriately. How well they are utilized is still very much an open question.

I still feel that the best answer to the problem is the simplest. Make deck officer (and engineering officer for that matter) an actual career track. Set it up so that you can continue to be promoted by gaining experience in the wheelhouse, and specializing in, as you called it, "ship driving."

CaptStash....

That's not the military. You're a ship driver until you reach LCDR. There's no career path for ship driving, it's something that is expected as part of your career development and you progress up the ranks. Ship driving is a collateral duty in addition to running a division or department. What you're describing is a pro officer of the deck, it's just not practical in the military, it would be a dead end, career-wise.

It's not really proving any point because you can't compare the career path of a naval officer to a merchant marine officer.

As far as an analysis of the current situation and where the Navy is hopefully heading, Commander Salamander slays it as usual.
http://cdrsalamander.blogspot.com/20...ss-review.html

[Fuzzy2964]

Originally Posted by bigbill

That's not the military. You're a ship driver until you reach LCDR. There's no career path for ship driving, it's something that is expected as part of your career development and you progress up the ranks. Ship driving is a collateral duty in addition to running a division or department. What you're describing is a pro officer of the deck, it's just not practical in the military, it would be a dead end, career-wise.

It's not really proving any point because you can't compare the career path of a naval officer to a merchant marine officer.

As far as an analysis of the current situation and where the Navy is hopefully heading, Commander Salamander slays it as usual.
http://cdrsalamander.blogspot.com/20...ss-review.html

I gotta agree with Big Bill. Military officers often spend more time outside of their warfare specialty than in it. That certainly was the case for me. In a 21 year career as a Navy pilot... I was also a program analyst, a comptroller, a recruiter and spent time getting a Masters degree. I was behind a desk more often than in the cockpit. This is the reality of being a US military officer. Professional Maritime Officers are going to have more at sea experience than US Navy Surface Warfare Officers. Commercial Airline Pilots are going to have more flight hours and experience than US Military Pilots. The career track of a US military officer is often decided on what you accomplished outside of your warfare specialty. So, leaving your warfare specialty is vital if you want to promote.

[oldpotatoe]

Originally Posted by Fuzzy2964

I gotta agree with Big Bill. Military officers often spend more time outside of their warfare specialty than in it. That certainly was the case for me. In a 21 year career as a Navy pilot... I was also a program analyst, a comptroller, a recruiter and spent time getting a Masters degree. I was behind a desk more often than in the cockpit. This is the reality of being a US military officer. Professional Maritime Officers are going to have more at sea experience than US Navy Surface Warfare Officers. Commercial Airline Pilots are going to have more flight hours and experience than US Military Pilots. The career track of a US military officer is often decided on what you accomplished outside of your warfare specialty. So, leaving your warfare specialty is vital if you want to promote.

Not trying to argue and maybe different eras and communities but to be successful in the USN fighter community(in the 70s and 80s, early 90s), it was essential you not only stayed in your warfare specialty, but stayed same coast. I was ‘hurt’ by being Med squadron as nugget but then 6 years out of the ‘community’, 3 years USAF exchange then 3 years onboard USS Midway-Maru homeported in Japan. I was essentially ‘homeless’ as I transitioned to F-14s for my department head tour(VF-31), but nobody knew who I was. Those guys who did a fleet flying tour, then say TraCom, then deployed staff...lots of those guys got ‘lost’ too. They were lucky to get a timely department head tour but if they stayed on staffs too long, they may have made O-5 but no command...w/o a command, it’s rare to make O-6 and never flag....at least in USN fighter community. I was lucky to get special mission XO/CO(VF-126) but no bonus command for guys like me.

Thanks for your service!!

[bigbill]

Originally Posted by oldpotatoe

Not trying to argue and maybe different eras and communities but to be successful in the USN fighter community(in the 70s and 80s, early 90s), it was essential you not only stayed in your warfare specialty, but stayed same coast. I was ‘hurt’ by being Med squadron as nugget but then 6 years out of the ‘community’, 3 years USAF exchange then 3 years onboard USS Midway-Maru homeported in Japan. I was essentially ‘homeless’ as I transitioned to F-14s for my department head tour(VF-31), but nobody knew who I was. Those guys who did a fleet flying tour, then say TraCom, then deployed staff...lots of those guys got ‘lost’ too. They were lucky to get a timely department head tour but if they stayed on staffs too long, they may have made O-5 but no command...w/o a command, it’s rare to make O-6 and never flag....at least in USN fighter community. I was lucky to get special mission XO/CO(VF-126) but no bonus command for guys like me.

Thanks for your service!!

Operations Department had P3 pilots doing their sea tours. Part of the path was to qualify OOD on a carrier and I always felt lucky to get them on my bridge team to train. They didn't like ship driving but understood if they ever wanted to be an Operations Officer or break out against their peers for promotion, they needed that OOD letter. Squadron XO/CO's would come up and I'd let them drive to see if carrier CO/XO was something they wanted.

I used to teach nuclear power and I would get assigned to a Commander who was completing their nuclear training before heading to a carrier for their XO tour. All carriers are nuclear and the CO and XO have to be carrier aviators and graduates of nuclear power school. I was a personal instructor so they could complete their training quickly. IME, the fighter pilots (Tomcats, prior Crusaders) had a harder time with the nuclear training. Maybe it was their previous training pipeline. When I was on the TR, the CO flew (Hornets) a few times a week and even flew a strike over Afghanistan in late 2001.

[Fuzzy2964]

My comments were in comparing commercial sailors/pilots to military sailors/pilots. The point being that the commercial side is virtually always sailing/flying, while military officers are often not sailing/flying during the course of a normal career. Certainly spending too much time away from your community will hurt you in promoting. So, I agree with your comments OldPotatoe. It is a delicate balance to spend enough time flying, while still getting to the Pentagon, be on a staff, pick up a Masters Degree, etc and do all of those things our commercial counterparts don’t necessarily have to do.

But, I’m sure that all of us who have had the honor to serve our country in the US Navy gladly took on those non flying/non sailing assignments, so that we could get back to the fun stuff of operating at sea.

Originally Posted by bigbill

Operations Department had P3 pilots doing sea tours. Part of the path was to qualify OOD on a carrier and I always felt lucky to get them on my bridge team to train. They didn't like ship driving but understood if they ever wanted to be an Operations Officer or break out against their peers for promotion, they needed that OOD letter. Squadron XO/CO's would come up and I'd let them drive to see if carrier CO/XO was something they wanted.

I used to teach nuclear power and I would get assigned to a Commander who was completing their nuclear training before heading to a carrier for their XO tour. All carriers are nuclear and the CO and XO have to be carrier aviators and graduates of nuclear power school. I was a personal instructor so they could complete their training quickly. IME, the fighter pilots (Tomcats, prior Crusaders) had a harder time with the nuclear training. Maybe it was their previous training pipeline. When I was on the TR, the CO flew (Hornets) a few times a week and even flew a strike over Afghanistan in late 2001.

[bigbill]

Originally Posted by Fuzzy2964

My comments were in comparing commercial sailors/pilots to military sailors/pilots. The point being that the commercial side is virtually always sailing/flying, while military officers are often not sailing/flying during the course of a normal career. Certainly spending too much time away from your community will hurt you in promoting. So, I agree with your comments OldPotatoe. It is a delicate balance to spend enough time flying, while still getting to the Pentagon, be on a staff, pick up a Masters Degree, etc and do all of those things our commercial counterparts don’t necessarily have to do.

But, I’m sure that all of us who have had the honor to serve our country in the US Navy gladly took on those non flying/non sailing assignments, so that we could get back to the fun stuff of operating at sea.

The Navy uses USNS vessels for oilers, munitions ship, hospital, and supply ships. They are manned by civilian mariners who are civil servants who follow the path you describe. Professional shiphandlers on bridge and engineers in the engineroom. I spent several months doing salvage work on the USNS Grasp to clean up an Italian harbor. There was just a handful of active duty Navy on board, everyone else was a civilian mariner. In the past, all of these ships were manned by the Navy, there's been a shift towards civilians for this kind of deep draft duty. Much of this is forward deployed so crews rotate out after 3 or so months.

I transited the Panama Canal on a USNS ship as the Repair Officer, for me it was like being on a cruise ship. I've conned carriers through the Suez Canal, that was nerve-wracking every time. The Egyptian Pilot didn't add much value unless we were in the Bitter Lake.