OT: Boeing 737 MAX

[MattTuck]

Originally Posted by echappist

insofar as the net result is concerned, difference without distinction, and that's assuming there is a difference in the first place

end result is that Boeing essentially self-certifies

In our system, we (the people) are taxed and some amount of that is allocated to the FAA by our elected reps. When we get on a plane, the expectation of the layperson is that the FAA is working on the public's behalf, and that the plane is as safe as can reasonably be expected.

In a laissez-faire system, the layperson would go into it with eyes wide open that the plane manufacturer and airline are the only backstop to their safety.

It seems what we have here (atleast in this narrow example of the 737 Max 8) is a system where the public at large believed the FAA was doing its job, while the reality was much more of a delegation of regulatory oversight. If this were widely publicized/known, perhaps fewer people would have been willing to fly on the 737 Max 8, from the start -- and certainly fewer people would have been willing after the Lyon Air crash.

Put another way, for lassaiz-faire to work, the market participants need to know they're in a lassaiz-faire system. If the aviation consumer is in such a system, but they believe there is stringent regulation, then that certainly dulls their perceived need to do their homework.

Before all this, I (maybe naively) thought the FAA was quite stringent on certifying planes, simply because I remember hearing about the rigorous tests that the Dreamliner had to go through.

[verticaldoug]

This is not Laissez-faire, it's regulatory capture. There is a difference.

In fact, it is almost a reverse system. You have a government that says one thing and does another. I had a conversation about fracking with a water expert many years ago about all the proposed rules for NYS and won't this make it fracking safer? They said (correctly), if it is not funded, it doesn't exist. Because NYS will not fund enforcement, the rules mean nothing.

If you want to see where regulatory capture is happening in USA, just look at where agencies are experiencing budget cuts. In fact, in a system like this, you get gresham's law.

see the financial crisis for details.

[azrider]

Originally Posted by alancw3

this cannot be good for being and rightfully so:

https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/20/asia/...ntl/index.html

Wow....what a crazy twist in the storyline........

[echappist]

Originally Posted by verticaldoug

This is not Laissez-faire, it's regulatory capture. There is a difference.

In fact, it is almost a reverse system. You have a government that says one thing and does another. I had a conversation about fracking with a water expert many years ago about all the proposed rules for NYS and won't this make it fracking safer? They said (correctly), if it is not funded, it doesn't exist. Because NYS will not fund enforcement, the rules mean nothing.

If you want to see where regulatory capture is happening in USA, just look at where agencies are experiencing budget cuts. In fact, in a system like this, you get gresham's law.

see the financial crisis for details.

See also the FDA (whole sorts of shenanigans going on there)

Also, even one does have the ability to charge and prosecute, not all prosecutors will decide to file charges. People seem to concerned with batting 1.000 than they are with doing what's right.

There's a story of how when Comey became the Attorney for Southern District of NY, he asked his prosecutors how many has not lost cases, and quite a few enthusiastically raised their hands. Comey remarked that these prosecutors were chicken s*** prosecutors too concerned with their own stats.

That said, I think regulatory capture is the natural end result of laissez-faire. It's not as if those two are distinct.

[echappist]

Originally Posted by MattTuck

In our system, we (the people) are taxed and some amount of that is allocated to the FAA by our elected reps. When we get on a plane, the expectation of the layperson is that the FAA is working on the public's behalf, and that the plane is as safe as can reasonably be expected.

In a laissez-faire system, the layperson would go into it with eyes wide open that the plane manufacturer and airline are the only backstop to their safety.

It seems what we have here (atleast in this narrow example of the 737 Max 8) is a system where the public at large believed the FAA was doing its job, while the reality was much more of a delegation of regulatory oversight. If this were widely publicized/known, perhaps fewer people would have been willing to fly on the 737 Max 8, from the start -- and certainly fewer people would have been willing after the Lyon Air crash.

Put another way, for lassaiz-faire to work, the market participants need to know they're in a lassaiz-faire system. If the aviation consumer is in such a system, but they believe there is stringent regulation, then that certainly dulls their perceived need to do their homework.

Before all this, I (maybe naively) thought the FAA was quite stringent on certifying planes, simply because I remember hearing about the rigorous tests that the Dreamliner had to go through.

Matt, I appreciate you typing up a detailed response, and that your posts are almost always insightful. that said, i object to in your point re: laissez-faire. It almost sounds like Randian ideal of objectivism or a Marxist ideal: fine in writing, almost never occurs or works in real life.

My definition of laissez-faire (btw, im surprised an economist misspelled it ) is thus different from yours. Yours seem to occurs in a context of ideal assumptions. My definition doesn't stray far from the original French: laissez is the second-person plural of laisser (to let) and faire means to do. It's basically an attitude of letting people (and corporations) do whatever they want. Whether that occurs because of lobbying, regulatory capture, or another means doesn't matter. What matters is that corporations largely get to do what they want to do, with little oversight.

Also, say we do indeed have the most ideal laissez-faire system, i doubt information symmetry per se is gonna do much, and by symmetry, I mean a company has made known just what they consider to be the break-even point btwn doing something that's safer vs paying out settlements. Most are still going to flock toward whatever is the cheapest, and it's unlikely that there would be too much pressure until quite a few tragedies occur. That doesn't even take into account that information symmetry likely does not exist in your version of laissez-faire...

[unterhausen]

Originally Posted by alancw3

this cannot be good for being and rightfully so:

https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/20/asia/...ntl/index.html

The only thing that could possibly be problematic for Boeing was that the the the AOA sensor was checked before the ill-fated flight and declared to be okay. I'm sure the investigation will be looking at this. The thing that looks bad for the airline is that this same problem was reported on 4 previous flights. And yet the pilots on the terminal flight didn't know how to fix it. Haven't they heard of sticky notes?

[GregL]

Originally Posted by unterhausen

The thing that looks bad for the airline is that this same problem was reported on 4 previous flights. And yet the pilots on the terminal flight didn't know how to fix it. Haven't they heard of sticky notes?

As oldpotatoe has said numerous times in this thread, it's incomprehensible that the crews in both flights did not immediately disconnect the electric pitch trim. Basic, professional airmanship is to disconnect any electronic flight control system if a flight control problem is noted. Runaway trim, autopilot hard-over, jammed vertical or horizontal stabilizer means disconnect the potential culprit(s) (e.g., electric pitch trim, autopilot, yaw damper, etc...).

The first plane that I flew with an electric-only pitch trim system was treated in my flight department with great concern. Our training syllabus spent much time on trim runaway procedures, use of the backup trim system, and flight with a jammed stabilizer. Runaway pitch trim was practiced during both initial and recurrent training. Nearly every check ride included a runaway pitch trim or jammed stabilizer scenario. With that background, I can't imagine how any professional pilot wouldn't immediately disable electric trim when faced with the situations that the two 737 Max crews faced. Not trying to disparage the dead, just wondering why they didn't practice basic airmanship.

Greg

[Louis]

Originally Posted by GregL

Not trying to disparage the dead, just wondering why they didn't practice basic airmanship.

I'm guessing that they were confused and their brains were processing stuff that lead them in another direction. They never had a chance to re-boot themselves and go through the appropriate procedures. (unless they did try to turn it off and for whatever reason couldn't)

[saab2000]

None of us was sitting in those seats and none of us knows how we would react. Critical situations can bring out the best and the worst in all of us and we can only hope we would know the right thing to do in this situation.

The media reports are still chock full of innuendo and rumors and speculation. While it is possible to make 'educated' guesses it is more important than ever to wait for facts to emerge and go from there. In the meantime it is good that the aircraft in question is grounded. That's about as controversial as I'll go, erring on the side of safety and public confidence.

Accidents like these, which are awful, involve lots of emotions and gut reactions and it's important to let impartial investigators do their work and submit reports. It is in the interests of everyone to allow facts, not fear or speculation or rumors, to drive actions.

[Louis]

Originally Posted by saab2000

The media reports are still chock full of innuendo and rumors and speculation.

Like the leak about the pilot on the Lion Air flight praying at the bitter end, the implication being that he should instead have been doing his job trying to save the aircraft. I'd say that there's a least some chance that was released to make the pilots look bad.

[Tony T]

Doomed Jets Lacked 2 Key Safety Features That Boeing Sold as Extras

Boeing’s optional safety features, in part, could have helped the pilots detect any erroneous readings. One of the optional upgrades, the angle of attack indicator, displays the readings of the two sensors. The other, called a disagree light, is activated if those sensors are at odds with one another. Boeing will soon update the MCAS software, and will also make the disagree light standard on all new 737 Max planes, according to a person familiar with the changes, who spoke on condition of anonymity because they have not been made public. The angle of attack indicator will remain an option that airlines can buy.

Many airlines, especially low-cost carriers like Indonesia’s Lion Air, have opted not to buy them — and regulators don’t require them.
Now, in the wake of the two deadly crashes involving the same jet model, Boeing will make one of those safety features standard as part of a fix to get the planes in the air again.

The three American airlines that bought the 737 Max each took a different approach to outfitting the cockpits.

American Airlines, which ordered 100 of the planes and has 24 in its fleet, bought both the angle of attack indicator and the disagree light, the company said.

Southwest Airlines, which ordered 280 of the planes and counts 36 in its fleet so far, had already purchased the disagree alert option, and it also installed an angle of attack indicator in a display mounted above the pilots’ heads. After the Lion Air crash, Southwest said it would modify its 737 Max fleet to place the angle of attack indicator on the pilots’ main computer screens.

United Airlines, which ordered 137 of the planes and has received 14, did not select the indicators or the disagree light. A United spokesman said the airline does not include the features because its pilots use other data to fly the plane.

I won't fly United anymore….
.

[sitzmark]

The only way to assess the efficacy of the optional indicators is to analyze the cumulative in-use data from the thousands of flights (with indicators) and determine the frequency of trigger.

If the indicators have routinely triggered, then there is a real world history of issue with the MCAS system. In that case there should have been an investigation into the MCAS system LONG before the crashes. I would find fault with the regulatory and maintenance "system" if this scenario proves true.

If the the indicator lights have not routinely triggered, then determining them to be a critical feature is based in the luxury of hindsight after the crashes.

As has been noted by experienced pilots, when an automated system becomes erratic it is time to disable the erratic system - light or no light.

[Tony T]

As a passenger, I would prefer my pilots to have these 2 indicators.

[batman1425]

Originally Posted by Tony T

United Airlines, which ordered 137 of the planes and has received 14, did not select the indicators or the disagree light. A United spokesman said the airline does not include the features because its pilots use other data to fly the plane.

As if their customer service wasn't bad enough... Another great reason to choose another carrier.

[Black Dog]

Originally Posted by sitzmark

The only way to assess the efficacy of the optional indicators is to analyze the cumulative in-use data from the thousands of flights (with indicators) and determine the frequency of trigger.

If the indicators have routinely triggered, then there is a real world history of issue with the MCAS system. In that case there should have been an investigation into the MCAS system LONG before the crashes. I would find fault with the regulatory and maintenance "system" if this scenario proves true.

If the the indicator lights have not routinely triggered, then determining them to be a critical feature is based in the luxury of hindsight after the crashes.

As has been noted by experienced pilots, when an automated system becomes erratic it is time to disable the erratic system - light or no light.

I agree with your statement that I bolded, however, isn't part of the issue at hand here is a system that was not disabled because the pilots we're not even aware that it existed and Boeing did not disclose in its flight manuals?