ot: so how do a merchant ship and destroyer have a collision?

[oldpotatoe]

[QUOTE=Fatty;2224613]

Originally Posted by smontanaro

Interesting article in Ars Technica about the Navy's recent spate of collisions:

I didn't read that particular article but is it referring to the possibility that the navigation or GPS systems on board may have been hacked? Maybe time to go old school and post a watch up in a crows nest.

They do have posted watches on deck. Nav and GPS doesn't tell you where another ship is. Radar and ship transponders(and watch crew) do. Weather was clear.

[thwart]

Originally Posted by smontanaro

Interesting article in Ars Technica about the Navy's recent spate of collisions:

https://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2017...-shortcomings/

Well worth a read.

"These days some Navy observers suggest the US may have the best equipped fleet in the world, but it no longer has the most skilled sailors driving them."

Hopefully this 'operational pause' will help the situation.

[MattTuck]

I think this probably has a lot to do with a shift in mindset. The Navy is now a force projection platform, not a navy meant to do battle on the high seas with other naval fleets. When was the last time the US Navy had an actual battle with another Navy? When did seamanship and naval strategy decide an engagement?

Navy now is about bringing troops, equipment and munitions to far away places to project US power. Seamanship isn't that important when all you really need to do is get close enough for your cruise missiles to reach their targets.

[CaptStash]

We see a lot of articles talking about what the NAVY does or doesn't do, and most of them off-handidly talk about what happens on a merchant ship bridge as if they know, when in reality, they haven't a clue as to the professionalism, training and knowledge of merchant seamen, and what they actually do on a ship's bridge. It gets a little frustrating.

The biggest difference is that Naval officers are not professional seamen, and do not possess the same level of skills that a merchant officer has. In the referenced article, the author (who is an IT professional, and had very little seagoing experience) gives an odd anecdote involving having to remember everything about thrity-nine contacts, which is ridiculous. Even trying to do that is begging for disaster.

In reality, what we do in busy situations, such as transiting the Singapore Straits (an area I have extensive experience with), is identify vessels that could cause a possible risk of collision, and not spend a lot of time on everyone else. It's sort of like triage. You deal with the worst first, and go from there. All merchant full sixed merchant ships carry a minimum of two radars designed for navigational and collision avoidance use. The radars are equipped with Automatic Radar Plotting Aids (ARPS) which can automatically track contacts and display CPA (closest point of approach), as well as the contact's course, speed and actual position. Additionally, information from AIS can be superimposed on the radar. Finally, ARPA has a trial maneuver mode, which shows what will happen if you change course or speed.

On a merchant ship's bridge, the deck officer is normally on watch with an able seaman who acts as a lookout. In areas where hand steering is expected to be in use, a second able seaman is typically called out to act as the lookout while the other steers. It would not be uncommon to (although I wouldn't do it) to still be in auto when entering the lanes in the area of the collision with the McCain. Taking a vessel out of auto is simple, you just flip a switch, and is something all able seamen know how to do, as it is not uncommon to go into hand during a watch to maneuver around traffic.

In the case of the collision with the McCain, it appears that the McCain had a steering casualty that caused her to cross ahead of the tanker with little warning. We will see what the VDR (Voyage Data Recorder - like a plane's black box) data shows, but I suspect that the Alnic will be found blameless in this case.

Assuming the information about the steering casualty is correct, a good root cause analysis of the incident will dig into why the steering gear failed in the first place. In general, vessel steering systems are simple and reliable, and shouldn't fail in such a way that a vessel suddenly veers off course. Additionally, a secondary steering system on a merchant vessel can be activated in a matter of seconds. I would be interested to learn if the same is true for a Naval vessel.

CaptStash....

[seanile]

https://www.cbsnews.com/news/two-7th...their-command/

"Two 7th Fleet commanders relieved of their command"

[wallymann]

http://warisboring.com/the-u-s-navy-is-flat-worn-out/

[smontanaro]

Both episodes are quite interesting (though scary). The second is specifically about how sleep deprivation can be a cause of collisions involving ships like the Fitzgerald and the McCain.

https://m.thisamericanlife.org/radio...ile-situations

Sent from my Pixel using Tapatalk

[bigbill]

I'm a retired shipdriver. I was an Officer of the Deck on carriers (1100' and 100K tons) and in my duties, I was in charge of a bridge team that included two junior officers, and five enlisted watchstanders. My job was the safe operation of the ship and to train the junior officers to have my job. Sleep deprivation can be a factor, but command environment where watchstanders feel free to speak up (questioning attitude) are vital.

The Navy has determined that excessive tasking of forward deployed ships has put sailors in a bad situation where they have to carry out missions regardless of physical condition of the sailors or the ship. The biggest failure is the lack of training of senior leaders. The Navy tried to cheapen and streamline Surface Warfare training by eliminating schools and sent junior officers to sea with a stack of CD's with lessons. Then those officers continued to move up in the ranks without the depth of experience and training of their predecessors. The Navy lost it's knowledge base. It also created an environment in the Surface Warfare world that was best described as "eating their young". Ships were overmanned with junior officers because they expected a high attrition rate. This environment didn't allow for adequate training or proficiency and was self fulfilling because it cause high attrition. The path forward addresses these issues and is highly critical of past practices and procedures. As a dad that will likely have a son at the Naval Academy next year, I follow the Navy's progress very closely.

[Ken Robb]

Originally Posted by bigbill

I'm a retired shipdriver. I was an Officer of the Deck on carriers (1100' and 100K tons) and in my duties, I was in charge of a bridge team that included two junior officers, and five enlisted watchstanders. My job was the safe operation of the ship and to train the junior officers to have my job. Sleep deprivation can be a factor, but command environment where watchstanders feel free to speak up (questioning attitude) are vital.

The Navy has determined that excessive tasking of forward deployed ships has put sailors in a bad situation where they have to carry out missions regardless of physical condition of the sailors or the ship. The biggest failure is the lack of training of senior leaders. The Navy tried to cheapen and streamline Surface Warfare training by eliminating schools and sent junior officers to sea with a stack of CD's with lessons. Then those officers continued to move up in the ranks without the depth of experience and training of their predecessors. The Navy lost it's knowledge base. It also created an environment in the Surface Warfare world that was best described as "eating their young". Ships were overmanned with junior officers because they expected a high attrition rate. This environment didn't allow for adequate training or proficiency and was self fulfilling because it cause high attrition. The path forward addresses these issues and is highly critical of past practices and procedures. As a dad that will likely have a son at the Naval Academy next year, I follow the Navy's progress very closely.

Thanks for this good perspective.

[oldpotatoe]

Originally Posted by bigbill

I'm a retired shipdriver. I was an Officer of the Deck on carriers (1100' and 100K tons) and in my duties, I was in charge of a bridge team that included two junior officers, and five enlisted watchstanders. My job was the safe operation of the ship and to train the junior officers to have my job. Sleep deprivation can be a factor, but command environment where watchstanders feel free to speak up (questioning attitude) are vital.

The Navy has determined that excessive tasking of forward deployed ships has put sailors in a bad situation where they have to carry out missions regardless of physical condition of the sailors or the ship. The biggest failure is the lack of training of senior leaders. The Navy tried to cheapen and streamline Surface Warfare training by eliminating schools and sent junior officers to sea with a stack of CD's with lessons. Then those officers continued to move up in the ranks without the depth of experience and training of their predecessors. The Navy lost it's knowledge base. It also created an environment in the Surface Warfare world that was best described as "eating their young". Ships were overmanned with junior officers because they expected a high attrition rate. This environment didn't allow for adequate training or proficiency and was self fulfilling because it cause high attrition. The path forward addresses these issues and is highly critical of past practices and procedures. As a dad that will likely have a son at the Naval Academy next year, I follow the Navy's progress very closely.

Hopefully he’ll go to flight school. Easier and harder at the same time.

[bigbill]

Originally Posted by oldpotatoe

Hopefully he’ll go to flight school. Easier and harder at the same time.

Wants to be a SEAL or Recon Marine. He'll tell everyone he wants to be a pilot so he'll blend in, but he wants to do the special forces workouts. We went to the Blue Chip dinner in Dallas on Thursday, sat one table over from Roger Staubach and Ross Perot. The guys at our table including a 2017 grad who is in flight school. On my way out, I leaned over and told him "never assume you caught the wire, the very best still bolt".

[oldpotatoe]

Originally Posted by bigbill

Wants to be a SEAL or Recon Marine. He'll tell everyone he wants to be a pilot so he'll blend in, but he wants to do the special forces workouts. We went to the Blue Chip dinner in Dallas on Thursday, sat one table over from Roger Staubach and Ross Perot. The guys at our table including a 2017 grad who is in flight school. On my way out, I leaned over and told him "never assume you caught the wire, the very best still bolt".

Good for him, wanting to be in small unit ops. Hope he’s happy in the water, being cold and sleep deprived.

[Ken Robb]

Originally Posted by oldpotatoe

Good for him, wanting to be in small unit ops. Hope he’s happy in the water, being cold and sleep deprived.

You forgot "sandy".

[bigbill]

Originally Posted by oldpotatoe

Good for him, wanting to be in small unit ops. Hope he’s happy in the water, being cold and sleep deprived.

I told him he needs to get an engineering degree of some kind. I have a hard time picturing him doing BUDS. I think he ought to do submarines like I did during the first 15 years of my career.

BTW, nice article about your MX Leader. I still have mine that I bought in 1998. Built up with a mix of Record 10 with alloy Centaur shifters (the good ones).

[AngryScientist]

Originally Posted by bigbill

I told him he needs to get an engineering degree of some kind. I have a hard time picturing him doing BUDS. I think he ought to do submarines like I did during the first 15 years of my career.

bill,

i've followed your posts here and across the hall about your son. congratulations to both of you for all he's accomplished up to this point.

i know you know this, but try not to steer him too hard, especially when it comes to submarine service - that's not a career you want to be "talked into".

some decisions a man needs to make for himself.